"At the Gate" as a Philosophical Shift Towards Postmodernism

In J.M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello, the story of the titular character is divided into eight lessons, each focused on an event in her life. In each of these lessons, Costello engages in some sort of philosophical discourse. Throughout the first seven of these lessons, Costello seems to have an empirical view on what she believes to be the truth. In general these discussions take on the form of “A or B,” where only one of either Costello or her opponent’s views may be true, a form of discussion fundamental to rationalist thought in classical and modern philosophy. The eighth, however, represents a dramatic shift in philosophical view for the main character. In the eighth lesson, “At the Gate,” the philosophy of Costello shifts from a modernist philosophical view towards the postmodern views of Jacques Derrida. Derrida’s notion of deconstruction is, in its simplest form, a simultaneous investigation of both sides of an argument which needs not come to one distinct conclusion. This idea can be represented by the logical expression “A and not A,” which accurately represents Costello’s final understanding of her own beliefs in the eighth lesson. To understand this shift, one must first understand Costello’s philosophy through the first seven lessons, and contrast it with that of the eighth, then explore its similarities with Derrida philosophy. I will show how “At the Gate” represents this shift towards postmodern philosophical thought as well as how Coetzee utilizes John Keats’ notion of “negative capability” to enhance this shift.

Through the first seven lessons, Coetzee establishes Costello’s approach to argumentation as congruent with the notions of modern and classical philosophy. Understanding how one lesson uses the idea of “A or B” as a thematic keystone will allow us to understand it as a template for each of the other six lessons. In lesson three, “The Lives of Animals: The Philosophers and the Animals,” Costello argues for the rights of the animals, specifically in relation to the mass production of food. She bases her public oration about animals on the comparison between modern farming and the death camps of the holocaust: “The crime of the Third Reich, says the voice of accusation, was to treat people like animals” (Coetzee, 65). Writing Costello, Coetzee uses direct language, such a “the voice of accusation,” to convey the forthright nature of Costello and her beliefs. Before explicitly introducing the topic of modern philosophy, the author hints towards the reader the dichotomic nature of Costello’s beliefs: the idea of “A or B,” which continues to serve as the structural foundation of arguments made by Costello in the text. On her own use of argumentative language, Costello remarks: “Such a language is available to me, I know. It is the language of Aristotle and Porphyry, of Augustine and Aquinas, of Descartes and Bentham, [...]” (Coetzee, 66). Coetzee is making clear to the reader the use of classical and modern philosophical argumentation by having Costello explicitly note the philosophers whom she is arguing against in her crusade for animal rights.

The argument she makes admits not of some possibility of both representing agreement with some belief and simultaneously disagreement with the same belief. In this case, it is unimaginable, to Costello, for her to be both a proponent of animal rights while at the same time exploring the opposing belief. In her mind, it would be disengenuous to admit a view opposing animal rights: any person who would oppose her view can only be seen, to her, as wrong. In this way, her argument is shown to take the form of “A or B,” that is to say there is a dichotomy which may only be resolved by taking the side of one of two distinct beliefs. Coetzee uses this idea through the two previous and three following lessons of the text, this rationalist nature of Costello’s arguments is consistent through all of the first seven lessons in Elizabeth Costello.

In lesson eight, “At the Gate,” Costello presents a belief which is incompatible with the rationalist nature of her arguments throughout the first seven lessons. In this lesson, she is thrust into an unfamiliar situation: she finds herself in front of a gate which seems to represent some sort of passage into heaven. At the mercy of the gatekeepers, she must assert what she believes in, and in exchange she shall be admitted passage through the gate which is established to be her ultimate goal in the context of this lesson. Coetzee uses this stange dreamlike and abstract literary setting, in the vein of Kafka, to distance it from the bearings established in the previous lessons, as Mullhall notes “Coetzee here gives it a decidedly literary setting – one that, as Costello notes with irritation, is essentially Kafkaesque [...]” (220). Due to this, it becomes clear from the beginning that this lesson represents something different from those lessons previous. Costello’s initial attempt to convey her beliefs is naive; she argues that she need not believe as her profession as a writer has its merit on acting as a non-biased party, a stenographer of life who simply listens and records. What is important is her second hearing before the board which will decide if she should be allowed into the gate: Costello here will present a new viewpoint on her belief.

In J.M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives On Literature, Michael Funk Deckard and Ralph Palm, in their essay Irony and Belief in Elizabeth Costello, state: “Costello is forced into an either (believe) or (not believe) decision, a fixed alternative she attempts to reject. However, what she rejects is not belief as such but only belief as expressed in terms of knowledge. Another sense of belief remains a possibility” (Leist, 346). Costello is confronted with a situation similar to the first seven lessons: she must either believe or not believe (“A or B”). In her first statement of belief she simply accepted an instinctual response that she did not believe, in agreement with her conceptions of her duty as a writer. By her second hearing, it is understood that there is some option which does not align with the philosophy of “either/or” as Deckard and Palm explain. This new conception of belief does not neccessarily result in a simple outcome as the arguments in the first seven lessons had; Deckard and Palmer continue, “The purpose of this exploration is not a resolution or a set of answers (i.e. a statement of particular beliefs, a manifesto) but a better understanding of the question (i.e. ‘What does it mean to believe?’), thereby achieving greater self-awareness” (Leist, 347). In this sense, Costello has moved beyond the scope of “either/or” philosophy into something greater, something which will allow her a stronger understanding of herself.

Costello’s new conception of belief aligns with Jacques Derrida’s notion of deconstruction and acts as a demonstration of postmodern philosophy. In Deconstruction in a Nutshell: a Conversation with Jacques Derrida, Derrida engages in a roundtable discussion at Villanova University in which he provides a core understanding of his concept of deconstruction, which is then analyzed by John D. Caputo. On Derrida’s mission in deconstruction, Caputo states, “The very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that things – texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and sort you need – do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are always more than any mission would impose, that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy” (31). Costello seems to use it in this way: to show that beliefs do not admit of some definable meaning or mission, that they exceed some “boundaries” which would otherwise bind them to the simple notion of “either/or” philosophy. In engaging with Derrida’s deconstruction, Costello imposes an understanding that beliefs, in general, depart from the simple conception she employed through the initial lessons. Caputo continues, “Deconstruction is the relentless pursuit of the impossible, which means, of the things whose possibility is sustained by their impossibility, of things which, instead of being wiped out by their impossibility, are actually nourished and fed by it” (32). This aligns with Costello’s application of deconstruction, in that she engages in a logical understanding of “A and not A”: an impossibility.

In her second hearing, the judges make a distinction between the two understandings of belief proposed by Costello. “ ‘I refer you to your first appearance before this court, when you gave as your occupation ‘secretary to the invisible’ and made the following statement: ‘A good secretary should not have beliefs. It is inappropriate to the function’; and, a little later, ‘I have beliefs but I do not believe in them’ ” (Coetzee, 220). Costello’s initial statement of non-belief takes the form of the rationalist view: she, given the option either to believe, or to not believe, chose one. Later, in stating that she has beliefs but she does not believe them, Costello has begun to engage in Derrida philosophy: deconstruction of belief as a whole. This moment, the inquiry of the judge, is the epiphany in the story of Elizabeth as a character: a moment of realization in her fundamental views of philosophy and argumentation. “You might as well ask which is the true Elizabeth Costello: the one who made the first statement or the one who made the second. My asnwer is, both are true. Both. And neither” (Coetzee, 221). She begins to argue that there exists multiple versions of her, which may either believe or not believe, as a personification of her stance: that she simultaneously is committed to both views. In her answer to the judges’ final inquiry, Costello makes a summary remark, “ ‘[...] do you speak for yourself?’ ‘Yes. No, emphatically no. Yes and no. Both’ “ (Coetzee, 221). In this final remark, she has committed entirely to a new philosophy, the philosophy of “A and not A”, the philosophy of the postmodernist Jacques Derrida.

Coetzee utilizes John Keats’ notion of negative capability to enhance Costello’s shift towards postmodernist philosophy. The simplest definition of negative capability is quoted by Ou, “I mean Negative Capability, that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason [...]” (1). In analyzing Coetzee’s lesson eight, “At the Gate”, one must ask themselves the merit of Costello’s shift towards postmodernism, towards the state of simulaneous belief and non-belief. To satisfy this inquisition, one must explore the question of whether or not Costello’s stance may be considered good. In a way, this is the entire purpose of the lesson: Coetzee leaves the reader to make this inquiry themselves, through the concluding statements of the text: “ ‘But you keep the records – who passes through, who does not. You must, in a sense, know.’ He does not answer” (Coetzee, 224). Her ultimate goal is to pass through the gate, which she may apparently do only if her statement on belief has merit (in the eyes of the judges of the gate, it seems). She talks to the custodian at the gate, and wishes to know if she will make it through, but the he does not offer her an answer. In the mind of Keats, Costello’s stance has merit: she has shown to be resolute in her simultaneous engagement of belief and non-belief, and seems to be capable of being in this state of uncertainty with stability. If Keats were the judge of the gate, he would, in understanding negative capability, allow Costello through. Coetzee, however, allows her fate remain unknown to the readers, for them perhaps to make their own judgement. The use of negative capability, Costello’s stability in uncertainty, enhances the shift towards Derrida philosophy and postmodernist thought.

Through the first seven lessons of Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee establishes a structure for the argumentation of Costello as in accord with modern and classical philosophical thought. Costello’s arguments, in general, take the form of “A or B,” wherein either one or another stance can be true, but not both at the same time. In lesson eight, “At the Gate,” Costello has a dramatic shift towards a more postmodern thought congruent with Jacques Derrida’s conception of deconstruction. This shift represents a total philosophical change in Costello as a character, and is enhanced by John Keats’ notion of negative capability. In the end, Costello’s belief takes the form of “A and not A,” and she is stable and steadfast in this stance. By simultaneously engaging both sides of an argument, Costello succeeds in self-discovery and is finally able to flourish.

Bibliography

Coetzee, J. M. Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons. London: Vintage, 2004.

Derrida, Jacques, and John D Caputo. Deconstruction In a Nutshell: a Conversation with Jacques Derrida. New York: Fordham University Press, 1997.

Derrida provides an understanding of his idea of deconstruction and how it relates to classical philosophy in the format of a question and answer discussion. This is exceedingly relevant to my essay as an understanding of deconstruction is central and necessary to my argument.

Leist, Anton, and Peter Singer. J.M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives On Literature. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

Various writers offer philosophical interpretations of J.M. Coetzee’s body of work including Elizabeth Costello, and explore the purpose and meaning of a variety of topics within the text. Part IV: Literature, Literary Style, and Philosophy is especially relevant to my essay as it offers a discussion of the philosophical ideas brought forth in lessons one through seven as well as their contrast to that of lesson eight.

Mulhall, Stephen. The Wounded Animal: J.M. Coetzee and the Difficulty of Reality In Literature and Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Mulhall explores the world of J.M. Coetzee, most importantly Elizabeth Costello, with an analytic view focused on philosophy as it is applied to modern literature. His dissection of lesson eight is relevant to my essay as it will help me understand and make arguments on how Coetzee uses philosophical ideas to convey its message.

Ou, Li. Keats and Negative Capability. London: Continuum, 2009.

Ou gives a comprehensive understanding of the concept of negative capability, how it originated, and how it is used in the works of Shakespeare and other literature. This is relevant to my essay as it provides and understanding of negative capability which will be useful in analyzing the relevant portions of lesson eight in Elizabeth Costello.